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teen and thirty-three. In all I have got about four hundred in working order. Girls are more difficult to train, and I could only reach about two hundred of them.

With the help of these I think we may escape riots here; already twice I got through the famous "C-G-T nets," but one must keep one's wits about; and while I was ill I went through anxious days. My husband is away now a fortnight every month, so that I am quite alone half the time. The government has elected me to the board of school controllers, and maybe I shall be sent to the national board of war orphans and several other things. I am still hoping to escape this fate; you see I have practically the power, and I am much freer without the titles; and it would mean a heavy loss of time, sitting round green baize. Talking does no good; it is far better to work and keep dumb.

We can't accuse the present government of being incapable. It does its best; but the situation is so very grave that it can't do much. We were too easy-going and have been strangled. That is the whole story. It is a sad one, but at all events an honorable one. After all, luck may turn; let us hope; it helps one to work. If only I was sure of our people's bread! You are going to think it is an obsession! Well, it is one.

The sanitary situation has not improved much, especially for women and small children; but of course it is always slow work at first. [X] has not yet one single house rebuilt; it is still just a heap of stones. I am sending you a little book in which you will find photos, photos taken in November, 1918, a little before your visit here. The other set dates from May, 1920, when the future was not yet a blank. You will be able to see the tremendous amount of work done; we were very proud of it.

Do you remember [X]? Well, it is practically alive again; I went there the other day and found the land tilled lovingly.

I am finishing this letter interrupted by an illness of L—— (false diphtheria) and by a relapse on my part, owing to overtaxed strength. It's stupid; but the truth is, work must be done, and I am no longer equal to it. Working with high fever is a slow job; but it has to be managed somehow. I am getting very anxious about my husband; these last days have left a mark on him, and there is no help for it. Good-bye, then, and good luck to you all.

Yours very sincerely,

P. S.—Yes! I am, etc. . . . Success does not mean much; what counts is the will to try, and often the help we get through a friendly word does more for us than would a fortune; it has sometimes the wonderful result of enabling us to fight our own battles till the end. I have seen the greatest successes grow out of apparent failures. The most precious gift is a part of our inner self, when it helps our neighbor to have a little more trust in humanity.

Thus we see something of that fine thing in French character which has always been attractive to Americans. More recent news leads us to believe that the situation has slightly improved for the suffering people in that devastated area. Premier Briand has just called attention to the fact that whereas the population of the devastated regions was 4,700,000 in 1914 and 1,900,000 at the time of the armistice, it is at present 4,100,000. Only poetry or music can express the depth of emotion

one feels as one thinks upon these heroic millions returning to their native soil with the will to work and to reinstate their lives and loves on a land practically a wilderness. These returning refugees have leveled 95 per cent of the area and have broken up the ground and reclaimed 80 per cent of it for agriculture; 50 per cent of the industries and mills are already in operation; 99½ per cent of the destroyed railways have been repaired, and, as we might expect from these French, 80 per cent of the art works have been restored.

While the war destroyed 1,036 kilometers of French canals, 1,017 kilometers have been wholly reconstructed; and of the 1,120 locks, culverts, etc., destroyed, 890 have been rebuilt. The French are planning to electrify all French canals carrying over 2,000,000 tons of traffic yearly, a program which will mean a saving of about 1,500,000 tons of coal each year. The total production of coal in France in 1920 was 25,276,304 tons, as against 22,478,766 tons in 1919; the production of the mines of the north and of the Pas-de-Calais destroyed during the war totaled 1,029,308 tons in December, 1920, as compared with 796,914 tons in December, 1919. The coal production of the Saar Basin in 1920 totaled 9,410,433 tons. The development of the Rhone water-power, begun in 1918, with the aid of the government, has proceeded to a joint agreement with Switzerland for the use of Lake Geneva as a regulator for the Rhone. With the completion of the projects begun or contemplated, it is estimated that France will be able to save from four to five million tons of coal annually.

The insinuation that France is making capital of her distresses in order to perpetuate hatred in the world can harm only the purveyors of such a canard.

RUSSIA ON PROBATION

GREAT BRITAIN, the United States, and the Soviet Administration at Moscow, with Lenin as spokesman, during the past month have contributed three distinct acts of importance to be chronicled and appraised.

The Anglo-Russian trade agreement, signed in mid-March, has nominally only to do with resumption of trade; but its political repercussions will be noted in Asia as well as in Europe, and were intended to be so registered. Indeed, it is likely that protection of her imperial interests in Asia had more to do with the British Ministry's final decision than did her desire to obtain and regain markets, powerful as the latter motive undoubtedly was.

The reiteration by the United States of its refusal to resume formal trade or political relations with Russia until guarantees on fundamental issues of all forms of stable society are given has met with the criticism of only a small minority of the people, and that mainly of

the radicals, native and foreign born. Their opposition is because of the disinclination of the American Republic to make the slightest concession to communism. In some cases their dissent is based on the doctrinaire theory that no nation has the right, even by negative action, to question the right of a people to choose any form of social structure and governmental organization that it pleases to elect.

The action by Russia herself, which has "intrigued" Europe and America, is the apparent concession by Lenin and the Moscow Government of a modification of the communistic scheme of social control, enforced hitherto by such drastic, dictatorial methods. He is on record as admitting the need now, if not always, of capitalism, at least in a modified form, if Russia is to be saved from internal economic ruin. That he has at all altered his ideal of the ultimate goal for Russia and the world is not proved. Not until it is proved, by policies for which he will be held responsible so long as he heads the Russian State, will the United States as a government pay attention to any forms of concession which he may make.

The British are not quite in the same position to take a stand for principle. Their labor party and their traders are active in urging an opportunist policy. In the United States no such pressure exists. Moreover, the United States is more conservative in defense of capital and of property than any other nation; and representatives of this conservative majority of the population are now in political control. Nor has the United States distant territories likely to be made radical and revolutionary by propagandists from Russia. And if she had, she might not be willing to accept as truthful such pledges of abstention from propaganda as the Soviet Government has made to Great Britain. The American Intelligence Bureau's agents in Europe and in Asia are sceptical of any such pledges, even the most formal and solemn, which Lenin may make. They have no confidence in his sincerity as a statesman. He will, they say, stoop to conquer; but his goal is and always will be destruction of the capitalistic state. And this however democratic in political form it may be. Similar distrust of socialism in general exists even where it declines alliance with Sovietism.

There is fascination as well as profound significance in the differing attitude of Great Britain and the United States toward Russia at the present time. History and tradition and coming economic rivalries should make Great Britain the critic, not the United States, with whom Czaristic Russia always was especially friendly. But events have so turned of late that the western democracy is now more hostile to the nascent communistic state than is the British empire.

CHINA AND "SELF-DETERMINATION"

CHINA's memory of her political, diplomatic, and financial intercourse with Europe is not of a kind to make her love either the Caucasian or his ethics. For the United States she has a much kindlier feeling, and this despite the Shantung provision of the Versailles Treaty. That is a recent incident, while antecedent to it has been a record Christian and fraternal in the main, and having its finest concrete expression not in the Lansing-Ishii compact between the United States and Japan, but instead in the "Open-Door" policy of John Hay and in the long-continued benign and self-sacrificing lives of missionaries and educators who have labored for and with the makers of a "New China."

During the past month the world has been given the text of the correspondence between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan anent the international consortium for financing China's internal development. It is by no means certain at this writing that this compact ever will become operative. The "nationalistic" spirit of Young China may defeat it. But there is this to be said about the compact to which the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan have agreed, namely, that it registers a long step upward and forward. Steadily, but surely, as the correspondence with Japan by Secretary Lansing and Earl Curzon discloses, Japan, at least formally, has been compelled to eliminate special claims in particular spheres of interest in China. On this basis, and this basis alone, Secretary Hughes, speaking for the new administration, has assented to a test of the plan, in the following important words:

"I am happy to advise you that the principle of this co-operative effort for the assistance of China has the approval of this government, which is hopeful that the consortium constituted for this purpose will be effective in assisting the Chinese people in their efforts toward a greater unity and stability."

Earl Curzon, speaking for Great Britain, as far back as August, 1919, in urging recession by Japan from her demands for special privileges should she join the consortium, said:

"This object cannot be achieved unless all parties to the scheme agree to sacrifice all claim to enjoy any industrial preference within the boundaries of any political sphere of influence."

Why, in the last analysis, Japan finally decided to play the game impartially hereafter we will not attempt to say. Her motives may have been pure or mixed. She has deep-rooted ambitions for primacy on the Asiatic continent, which run counter to this pledge. Her critics say that already she has treated the consortium pact as a "scrap of paper."

That is not the point we are emphasizing now. The